Regional and International Conflict Regulation: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Interventions

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Regional and International Conflict Regulation: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Interventions

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There is considerable case-specific and anecdotal evidence of the impact of international organisations in conflict regulation, but conceptual frameworks and systematic comparative research are lacking. We begin by categorising different strategies of regional and international conflict regulation and then offer one possible macro-framework to account for its success or failure. This framework combines a focus on factors internal to the relevant organisation (i.e. its capabilities to act, fund and coordinate and cooperate) with an analysis of the conflict context (at the local, state, regional and global level). We find six factors to be particularly important: availability of resources and willingness to deploy them to strategic effect, commonality of interest among member states or a lead nation/s, long-term and continuously sustained conflict regulation efforts rather than ad hoc/on and off crisis management, effective external cooperation with major partners, a permissive conflict context and local interest in ending rather than continuing the conflict.

INTRODUCTION

The international community – defined as international and regional organisations, as well as their (powerful) member states – has a deeply ambivalent attitude towards tackling the complexity of frequently internationalised intra-state conflicts and their dynamic, partially causal and partially consequential, relationship with (incomplete) democratisation processes, growing concerns about the economic viability of conflict-torn states and their potential successors, and an ever-increasing presence of transnational organised crime networks with significant reach beyond their country and region of origin. Perhaps, this is nowhere more apparent at present than in relation to Arab Spring. From the more-or-less enthusiastic military intervention in Libya to the reluctance of becoming drawn more deeply into the evolving conflict in Yemen, the wait-and-see policy in the case of Syria, and outright rejection of support for the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, the United Nations (UN), regional organisations and their individual member states offer anything but a coherent strategy on how to deal with the humanitarian and security challenges presented by the unrest that has engulfed large parts of the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011. Even where it seems at its most decisive, international intervention is far from it: at the time of writing in September 2011, the military campaign to protect Libyan civilians has been ongoing for more than four months.
Even though the Gaddafi regime has been ousted, the medium- and long-term implications of the intervention remain uncertain.

The international community has been there before. Take the example of the Western Balkans in the 1990s: finding a unified position on the recognition of the successor states of Socialist Yugoslavia proved a serious problem to the then European Community (EC) in the self-declared ‘hour of Europe’. Preventing and containing the bloody disintegration of the country was a task too big for the combined might of the UN, NATO, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), EC and all their member states. Feeble political will in the face of local actors determined to implement self-serving ethnocentric political agendas allowed the conflict first to escalate and then to go on for three years with around 100,000 people killed in Bosnia alone and millions displaced across the region. Even though the reaction was more determined and swifter in Kosovo in the late 1990s, it took three months of bombing and the credible threat of deploying ground troops before yet another crisis was contained – an example that does not bode well in the context of the evolving situation in Libya. Only in the case of Macedonia in 2001 is there a story to be told of a somewhat more successful prevention of violent conflict escalation. Yet, Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo remain inextricably linked as three cases in the Western Balkans that, despite superficial stability in the former two, and an apparent ‘solution’ of the latter, represent unresolved conflicts that all have significant potential to contribute to further regional instability. Similar, and similarly bleak, stories can be told of international (non-)interventions and their outcomes in the South Caucasus, in Africa (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, etc.), the Middle East (e.g. Iraq), Central Asia (Afghanistan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and so on.

The apparent ineptitude of the international community to regulate such conflicts effectively to one side, the management, settlement and prevention of conflict remain high on the agenda of many international organisations (IOs), which see this as one of their main security tasks. IOs have indeed become extensively involved in attempts at conflict management, settlement and prevention on a global scale. Moreover, calls for these organisations to increase their involvement are frequent. Despite all of this, however, our knowledge and understanding of the impact of IO (or, more generally, third-party) involvement in conflict regulation is still relatively limited. In particular, while there is considerable case-specific and anecdotal evidence, we lack conceptual frameworks and systematic comparative research on these issues. Offering one possible macro-framework for the study of regional and international regulation of intra-state conflict, our approach is informed by two fundamental premises: (1) conflicts, while complex political phenomena, can be managed, prevented and settled; and (2) it is possible to understand different regulation processes and discover certain regularities in them that can help us understand the broader notion of conflict regulation and the role of regional and IOs within it.

The purpose of this introduction to the case studies that follow is therefore twofold. First, we discuss an analytical model that allows us to identify, categorise and group a wide range of different factors that are relevant for understanding the
success and failure of conflict regulation efforts. Drawing on an existing body of international relations literature where the so-called levels-of-analysis approach has been developed and used since the late 1950s, we combine the study of ‘external’ factors that are beyond the full control of those who intervene to resolve a particular conflict, with a focus on a number of factors internal to the intervening party that co-determine whether an intervention succeeds or fails. Second, from this perspective, the primary interest guiding the following contributions is neither in the causes of conflict nor in the motivations of regional and IOs to intervene in particular cases of conflict. Rather our interest is in the causes of success and failure of these interventions; that is in the (external) factors that facilitate or prevent conflict settlement and in the (internal) factors that facilitate or prevent the formulation and implementation of policies of successful intervention.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT REGULATION: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL CLARIFICATION

Studying the performance of regional and IOs in the management of intra-state conflict encounters three specific conceptual difficulties. The first such difficulty is definitional and concerns the meaning and use of the term ‘conflict’ and the three distinct, but closely related practices of its management, prevention and settlement, which we subsume under the broader term ‘conflict regulation’. The second difficulty is related to the fact that the tools available and used for conflict regulation, i.e. the different policies used in dealing with conflict, vary significantly across regional and IOs. As we discuss next, this is related in part to the respective organisation’s capabilities and in part to the specific context of the conflict to be regulated. Yet before we can explain why particular tools are used, we need to bring some conceptual order to the range of different existing conflict regulation policies. The third difficulty is related to explaining why some conflict regulation efforts succeed while others fail and concerns the need to clarify what we mean by success.

Defining Conflict and Conflict Regulation

Generally speaking, the term ‘conflict’ describes a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just goals. More specifically for our purposes, we draw on the definition provided by Gleditsch et al., describing an armed conflict as a ‘contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’. As we are also interested in conflict prevention, or in other words in the regulation of potential conflicts, the battle-death threshold is not essential for our definition of conflict, even though all of our cases meet (and in several cases, considerably exceed) this criterion. Another element of the work by Gleditsch et al., however, is highly relevant, namely their typology of conflicts, which in turn relies on the Correlates of War project. Four types of conflict are identified: inter-state armed conflict (between two or more states), extra-state armed conflict (between a state and a non-state group outside the former’s own territory),
internationalised internal armed conflict (between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states), and internal armed conflict (between the government of a state and internal opposition groups). For our purposes, the first of these types is the least relevant. The relevance of the second type is limited, arguably, to the case of Afghanistan, albeit less so as far as NATO’s role there is concerned. However, all cases, including Afghanistan in the time frame of Sperling and Webber’s study, are examples of either internal or internationalised internal armed conflict.

Conflict regulation comprises three elements – prevention, management and settlement. This distinction, and the very terminology used, may seem arbitrary, and we do not proclaim to offer the definitive resolution to a long-standing debate in the literature on responses to intra-state conflict. We use prevention, management and settlement as concepts to aid in the understanding of different policies pursued by the parties to a conflict and by third parties involved in it. This becomes immediately clear when one considers the following three definitions.

**Conflict prevention** refers to a set of policies adopted at an early stage of a conflict, before violent escalation or after cease-fire/settlement has been negotiated to prevent resumption of violence. Conflict prevention aims at channelling conflict to non-violent behaviour by providing incentives for peaceful accommodation and/or raising the costs of violent escalation for conflict parties. Normally, a distinction can be made between short-term crisis management (averting an imminent violent escalation) and long-term structural prevention (eliminating the root causes of conflict). While conflict prevention thus has a place in the lifecycle of any intra-state conflict before its violent escalation and after its settlement, conflict management and conflict settlement can be defined more clearly in terms of a ‘single moment’ at which they occur.

We thus define **conflict management** as the attempt to contain, limit or direct the effects of an ongoing conflict. In contrast, **conflict settlement** aims at establishing an institutional framework in which the conflicting interests of different conflict parties can be accommodated to such an extent that incentives for cooperation and the non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation. Thus, conflict management is a strategy that is chosen in either one of two situations – when the settlement of a conflict is impossible or undesirable for one of the parties involved. Furthermore, conflict management is not always a benign attempt to contain an ethnic conflict and limit its negative consequences: it can also be a strategy of manipulation that seeks the continuation of a conflict for reasons beyond the conflict itself, such as the preservation of power and/or economic gain. Conflict management, thus, describes the wide range of policies adopted by actors in a conflict instead of negotiations, or after failed negotiations or implementation processes, whereas conflict settlement implies negotiated, accepted and implemented institutional structures. In this sense, conflict settlement and conflict prevention, if successful, have fairly similar outcomes.³

In view of the different types of policies that we, thus, conceptualise to be a part of regional and international conflict regulation, we define the term itself in the sense
of long-term engagement with a particular country or region, an engagement that, over time, will necessitate different conflict regulation policies, including diplomatic, economic and military engagements. This is apparent from a number of subsequent case studies that indicate that different interventions by regional and IOs involve elements of all three sets of policies, albeit to varying degrees. For instance, as elaborated in Özerdem’s and Smith-Cannoy’s contributions, both the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) mostly failed in their responses to conflicts in Mindanao and Haiti, respectively. As illustrated by Smith-Cannoy’s in this issue, the response of the OAS to the 2000 political crisis in Haiti was mostly diplomatic, if anything at all. The EU’s success in preventing a possible civil war in Macedonia, on the other hand, presents a different balance of diplomatic, economic and military means. As Peen Rodt and Wolff explain, the EU operation in Macedonia had teeth. As illustrated in Peen Rodt’s study, despite the fact that the African Union (AU) lacked financial means, its mission in Burundi was relatively successful in militarily managing the violent conflict.  

The second difficulty arises from the very fact that conflict regulation as defined here involves not only a wide range of distinct policies but also different institutional procedures across the regional and IOs considered in the following. Moreover, there is also a great deal of ‘variation’ within these organizations which often lack a single ‘executor’ or commonly agreed approach to conflict regulation. Take the example of the EU as illustrated in Peen Rodt and Wolff’s contribution. While more pronounced before the coming in force of the Lisbon Treaty, the very term EU conflict regulation is somewhat misleading, as different policies are, often jealously guarded, prerogative of different institutions with their distinct competences, resources and decision-making procedures. A clear example of this is the difference between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): the former clearly inter-governmental and run by the Council, the latter attached to the Commission. Moreover, CSDP, in terms of resources at least, is much more dependent on cooperation with NATO (principally, under the 2002 Berlin Plus arrangements), while ENP with its ‘softer’ policies is relatively more independent. At the same time, however, there is clearly a more significant potential for real and meaningful policy coordination in the post-Lisbon era as the joint launch of the ENP review on 25 May 2011 by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice-President, Baroness Catherine Ashton, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, indicates.  

The problem with coordination is not unique to the EU. As noted by Özerdem, the OIC also experiences a similar coordination problem, even to a greater extent when compared with the EU, as its members vary greatly in terms of their geographical locations, socio-political structures and economic development levels. Similarly, as stated in Pushkina and Maier’s contribution, the UN structure allows for the individual members’ national interests to impede the UN’s ability to cooperate with other organisations and with regional and local authorities. Furthermore,
as demonstrated by Aris’ contribution, during the Osh crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the divisions among some of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members were brought into the spotlight, leading Aris to conclude that the SCO lacks the capability to adopt a common approach to security crises. Smith-Cannoy similarly notes that the will of the OAS member states leads to ‘selective’ diplomatic interventions by the organisation. Finally, as illustrated by Sperling and Webber’s analysis on NATO, the Alliance is similarly not immune to such problems. NATO suffers from a lack of consensus within the Alliance regarding its goals in Afghanistan, as indicated by debates on burden-sharing, the emergence of a ‘two-tier’ alliance, the lack of coordinated strategic thinking and operational difficulties on the ground.

The Tools of Conflict Regulation

The international community, and individual and collective actors within it, use a variety of tools in the process of conflict regulation. Before we discuss these different tools and their utility for conflict regulation, it is worth pointing out that there has been a clear trend for the past two decades, associated primarily with the end of the Cold War, towards ever more international efforts to regulate (internationalised) internal conflict. This is clearly evident from two sets of figures. While during the Cold War period the UN normally had no more than ‘two or three truce supervision or observation operations at any one time’, the total number of ongoing UN peace operations on 31 May 2011 stood at 14, 11 of which were deployed in cases of (internationalised) internal conflict. This trend strikingly also applies to the EU, which has massively increased its engagement in international conflict regulation. Barely noticeable as a global political player throughout the 1990s (except for its failures in the Balkans), the organisation has conducted 24 operations since 2003. Of these, 22 missions were deployed to countries experiencing (internationalised) internal conflict, 12 of them were ongoing as of June 2011.

There is no suggestion here, that all of these missions are similar in terms of their objectives, personnel commitment, costs, length or success. Nor do we imply that these missions are the only tools at the disposal of, or deployed by, international actors in their efforts to prevent, manage and settle internal or internationalised internal conflicts. Yet, because of the comparative scale of the ongoing commitments, it is worthwhile discussing them in a little more depth before looking at other tools of international conflict regulation. During the Cold War, the predominant type of operation conducted is commonly referred to as traditional peacekeeping or observation and interposition operations – after the conflict parties agree to a cease-fire, observers are deployed to monitor the situation and/or provide a buffer zone between the conflict parties. Two of the UN’s oldest mission – those in Kashmir (UNMOGIP) and Suez (UNEF) dating back to 1949 and 1956, respectively – fall in this category. In the post-Cold War period, this type of operation continues to be of importance, but increasingly international or regional missions are more complex. These so-called peace-building, peace support or stability operations have much broader objectives, reflecting an increasing
acceptance of the need for a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. For example, a number of EU missions are aimed at security sector reform (especially capacity-building in relation to police forces and border guards, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Georgia) and/or the development of the culture and institutions of the rule of law (Kosovo, Georgia). The UN mission to East Timor was perhaps the most ambitious of these new-type operations as it aimed at building a new state, enabling East Timor’s transition from a territory occupied by Indonesia to a full-fledged member of the international community of sovereign states.11 Moreover, even in cases of international intervention that retain traditional peacekeeping elements, other tasks have been added. Humanitarian operations, especially in aid of refugees and internally displaced persons, election organisation and observation, and institutional capacity-building are now almost standard components of peace-building missions, as evidenced by the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the AU mission in Darfur.

Most of the missions referred to above fall four square into the area of conflict management and settlement as defined above. There are, however, also some that are more preventive in nature, i.e. are deployed before the outbreak of violence. The UN’s preventive deployment mission to Macedonia, and its successors, is the prime example here not only of such missions in general, but also of their success. Taking a slightly broader view of prevention, however, by extending the notion to include also actions taken during the violent and post-violent phases of a conflict to prevent further violence is analytically useful as it allows assessing any external action taken to prevent the eruption, escalation, diffusion or intensification of violent conflict in its proper context. From this perspective, then, the deployment of peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 onwards did little to either prevent the escalation of the ethnic conflict there or to resolve it, while their presence post-Dayton was clearly an effective measure to prevent renewed violence (so far) without contributing to an actual resolution of the conflict. The same holds true for the UN Mission to Cyprus, while the one in Kashmir on three occasions failed to prevent military hostilities between India and Pakistan.

The deployment of actual missions to conflict zones is not the only tool that the international community has at its disposal to achieve desirable outcomes in the process of its engagement in conflict prevention, management and settlement efforts. A range of other options are available, and their use is far more frequent and involves a much broader set of actors. Multiple tools and actors invite different classifications of external interventions, but this is not the place to discuss the merits of different ways of approaching the issue of how to distinguish between different types of intervention.12 Rather, we simply list a set of common types of diplomatic, economic and military forms of intervention and illustrate what they involve in the context of internal and/or internationalised conflict.

Diplomatic interventions normally precede other forms of intervention and aim at either averting violent escalation of a conflict or establishing conditions conducive to de-escalation. The failure of diplomatic efforts to change the behaviour of conflict
parties on the ground often leads to either more coercive measures applied to both parties or selective coercion and/or support for individual parties.

As explained in Özerdem’s contribution, in the Mindanao conflict, for instance, the OIC successfully used conditionality to put diplomatic pressure on both parties to return to the negotiating table in 1975. The EU currently uses conditionality to ensure that talks between Kosovo and Serbia continue and address a range of practical issues in the relations between the two countries in the absence of Serbian recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

As another tool among diplomatic interventions, fact-finding missions offer the international community an opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of a particular situation and raise broader awareness of an impending crisis. For example, the UN dispatched a fact-finding mission to Abkhazia, Georgia, in the early 1990s before establishing its own permanent operation there, while the OSCE deployed such a mission to Kosovo in a last-ditch effort to avoid a military intervention against Serbia. In some cases, fact-finding missions are deployed ex post facto as was the case with the EU-sponsored Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.

Mediation can follow fact-finding in an effort to intensify prevention efforts, but can also be applied as an approach to aid de-escalation once conflict parties on the ground have decided that they cannot resolve their dispute through violence. Joint EU–NATO mediation in Macedonia in 2001 (see Peen Rodt and Wolff in this issue) is an example of successful mediation, while the Rambouillet negotiations on Kosovo in 1999 failed. In some cases, mediation succeeds in achieving a negotiated agreement between the parties, while the agreement itself subsequently breaks down. The AU-mediated Arusha Accords for Rwanda are one of the most tragic illustrations of this.

Confidence-building measures often accompany other forms of diplomatic, economic and/or military intervention. They are designed to enable parties to begin rebuilding trust between them and often involve a variety of different actors, including political elites, the private sector and civil society groups. Above all, they aim at making the actions and intentions of different parties more transparent to reduce fear and increase a sense of security, for example through regular meetings and day-to-day coordination of activities, such as in the case of the Joint Control Commission established after the 1992 Sochi Agreement on South Ossetia or the UN-facilitated Coordinating Council established in Abkhazia in 1997. They can also involve civil society initiatives, such as the so-called Standing Technical Working Groups established by the European Centre for Minority Issues, an NGO, in Kosovo after 1999 to enable Albanians, Serbs and members of other communities to deal with both very pragmatic issues, such as healthcare and economic development, and highly sensitive issues, such as education and refugee return. Similarly, as noted in Özerdem’s study, the OIC has frequently used confidence-building measures such as the provision of good offices, mediation, fact-finding missions and conciliation.

International judicial measures, finally, are a relatively recent addition to the set of diplomatic instruments available to the international community when it comes to
dealing with ethnic conflicts. They can either involve prosecution for crimes committed during a conflict after a settlement has been achieved, such as in the cases of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or they can be used as a tool of intervention in an ongoing conflict, such as the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court in 2008 or that of Muammar Gaddafi, one of his sons and a close associate in 2011. International judicial measures serve two purposes: they are meant to be punitive for crimes already committed and to have a deterrent effect for future conflicts.

Among the cases analysed here, the OAS is perhaps the organisation that used such diplomatic interventions the most. As noted in Smith-Cannoy’s study, the OAS’s confidence-building measures helped promote peaceful relations in civil wars in Central America. The OAS has also jointly conducted human rights monitoring mission with the UN in the aftermath of the 1991 coup against Aristide in Haiti, besides its many electoral observation missions across the region. Nevertheless, as Smith-Cannoy notes, the OAS also missed key opportunities to use more effective measures, such as sanctions against Haiti, to press Aristide to reach a peace agreement with the opposition.

Economic interventions can be used to induce behaviour by conflict parties deemed to be in accordance with international efforts to prevent, manage or settle a particular conflict and to sanction behaviour that runs counter to such efforts. Among them, humanitarian aid/assistance is applied without any conditions attached and aimed at relieving civilian suffering by providing food, shelter and a minimum of healthcare. While often initiated as an emergency response to an escalating crisis, such as the November 2008 UN relief operation in the eastern DRC, humanitarian assistance can, in some cases, continue for decades, as in the case of UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which has been active since 1 May 1950 and remains the principle aid organisation for currently 4.6 million Palestinian refugees. Another potential problem with humanitarian aid and assistance is the potential for abuse – Operation Lifeline Sudan launched by the UN in cooperation with over 30 NGOs in April 1989 was meant to provide food aid to civilians suffering from the violence between north and south but essentially introduced a commodity into a civil war that created an income opportunity for the warring parties who seized food convoys and sold on their bounty or extorted protection fees to guarantee safe passage.

The delivery of technical (economic) assistance, in contrast, is often tied to specific conditions of reform or compliance with provisions in cease-fire agreements of peace settlements. It covers a broad range of measures that can be partisan and non-partisan in nature, be delivered by governmental and non-governmental actors, and often applied as post-conflict economic assistance, including through donor conferences. As noted in Pushkina and Maier’s contribution in this issue, both United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor and its predecessor United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) were funded considerably well with the assistance of external donors to help the Timorese government with the provision of a number of services. For instance, UNTAET and the World Bank
facilitated the repair of irrigation systems and constructed schools and other physical infrastructure in Timor-Leste. As noted in Peen Rodt’s analysis in this issue, while the limited resources of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) resulted in insufficient food, medical supplies and infrastructure in the cantonment areas in Burundi initially, AMIB later convinced the EU to supply food and medical aid.

While assistance thus is essentially a cooperative instrument of international conflict regulation, embargoes and sanctions aim at depriving one or both conflict parties of the means to fight and thus coerce them to comply with international demands. They are a frequent first step in escalating international involvement once diplomatic efforts have failed. Their impact and utility, however, are controversial. The arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia during the 1992–95 war of succession arguably benefitted the Serbs most as they controlled the assets of the Yugoslav People’s Army, while the targeted (or the so-called smart) sanctions against Milosevic later in the decade contributed more clearly to his downfall by denying him the resources necessary to maintain his clientelist regime. Economic intervention may not always bring in the desired outcome. As noted in Peen Rodt and Wolff’s study, the EC responded to the violence in Bosnia in 1992 by freezing all financial aid to the region. However, with the elimination of the trade embargos against Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, the Serbian delegation withdrew from the negotiations and the EC peace efforts collapsed.

Another problem with embargoes and sanctions is that of enforcement (which is difficult to ensure at the best of times). For example, once Russia stopped enforcing the Commonwealth of Independent States embargo against Abkhazia in the late 1990s, Georgian efforts to coerce the leadership of this separatist region to engage in meaningful negotiations had lost all leverage. Related to the problem of enforcement is the inevitable smuggling and corruption that sanctions create, often consolidating operations of criminal networks across borders and entrenching them within society by giving them a degree of legitimacy as ‘essential service providers’, as has been the case across the Western Balkans since the early 1990s. Moreover, even in the age of the so-called ‘smart’ sanctions, civilian populations, while already affected by conflict, tend to suffer disproportionately from the application of sanctions and embargoes.

Nevertheless, economic power does not equate with, or may not always be translated into, strategic leverage. Peen Rodt and Wolff recount the failures of the EC in the early 1990s, despite its economic prowess, and Aris notes that, the leading SCO members China and Russia have so far refrained from supporting an SCO intervention force, despite their increased resources and capabilities for the Peace Mission exercises. Similar discrepancies between economic power and strategic leverage arguably also exist in relation to the OAS and the OIC.

The category of military interventions, finally, covers a broad spectrum of international efforts from the deployment of traditional peacekeeping forces to oversee cease-fires and separate warring factions to military components of international post-conflict reconstruction operations, to the use of force on the territory of a state who has not consented to such an intervention. Peacekeeping was,
for most of the Cold War period, the predominant measure taken by the international community (i.e. the UN) in this context to manage ethnic conflicts. Their track record is mixed at best. The UN operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was unable to prevent violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the early days after its launch in 1964 and was helpless in the face of the attempted Greek coup against the elected Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, in 1974 and the subsequent inter-communal violence on the island. Since the de facto partition of the island between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot communities, however, it has overseen a relatively high degree of stability. This ambiguous success, however, is dwarfed by the monumental failure of the UN operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to prevent the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis. UN peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia equally struggled to keep a non-existing peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the summer of 1995 when a more robust (US–NATO-driven) approach of using the full scope of the mandate provided by the UN Security Council, including air strikes against Serb forces, contributed to bringing Serbs to the negotiation table in Dayton – after the massacre of Srebrenica in which Serb forces killed several thousand Bosniak (Muslim) men, virtually under the eyes of a Dutch peacekeeping battalion. Nevertheless, this track record does not necessarily mean that successful examples of military management of violent conflicts are non-existent. As noted in Peen Rodt’s study, for example, the deployment of AMIB forces stabilised the country to an extent that the UN was willing and able to deploy.

Peace support or stability operations have by-and-large replaced traditional peacekeeping operations. These are more complex operations in terms of their mandate, extending far beyond cease-fire observation and the separation of combatant forces on the ground. While there is a recognition that security is a condition sine qua non for sustainable peace in the aftermath of ethnic conflict, there is equally a realisation now that mere peacekeeping does little to settle an actual conflict – at best, it contains violence, at worst it gives conflict parties an opportunity to rearm and regroup before the next round of violence. Peace support operations are thus meant to create conditions in which other efforts can succeed. Take the example of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), for example. Established after NATO’s intervention in 1999, it brought together a multitude of actors to perform a wide range of different tasks deemed necessary to rebuild Kosovo economically, socially and politically, and contribute to settling the underlying conflict. Under the leadership of the UN, NATO was to provide security, the OSCE was charged with building democratic institutions and the EU was given the task of economic reconstruction. While far from a resounding success, UNMIK embodies the very complex nature of contemporary peace support operations and illustrates their potential for success and failure shaped equally by organisational factors and conditions on the ground.

NATO’s International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is one of the latest examples of peace support operations. As Sperling and Webber’s study in this issue illustrates, NATO has increased the number of Provisional Reconstruction Teams to support local projects of humanitarian relief, economic
reconstruction and security sector reform in Afghanistan, and the need for such civil–military coordination is also recognised in its Comprehensive Approach and new Strategic Concept.

The use of force by the international community without the consent of the state on whose territory the intervention takes place remains the exception among military interventions. As emphasised by various contributions in this volume, many IOs remain reluctant to use force and violate the concept of national sovereignty in defence of democracy and human rights. As Aris’ study notes, in its response to the Osh crisis, the SCO has underlined that military intervention in internal conflicts and security breakdowns are not its main goal. As Özerdem’s study illustrates, the OIC similarly emphasises the need to respect the sovereignty, the right of self-determination and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states. Once again, as noted in Smith-Cannoy’s study, up until 1991, the OAS remained dedicated to the respect for sovereignty at all costs. Only with the adoption of Resolution 1080 in 1991 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001, did the OAS clarify its intervention protocol and specify the conditions under which OAS members can intervene.

Similar to the case of the OAS before 1991, the Organisation of African Unity upheld the respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of its members. Nevertheless, the AU as its successor dismissed the policy of non-interference and acknowledged its right to intervene in its member states under certain circumstances.

Yet, what is often referred to as humanitarian intervention or humanitarian military intervention remains highly controversial, despite its infrequency. Moreover, while by the end of the 1990s a consensus seemed to emerge around the recognition of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) populations from systematic and gross violations of their human rights, this consensus more or less evaporated again in the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Iraq. The NATO-led enforcement of a no-fly zone against the Gaddafi regime in Libya under UN Security Council Resolution 1973(2011) may be taken as a resumption of this nascent consensus – albeit with the caveat that at the time of writing in July 2011, NATO’s interpretation of what action is permissible under this resolution is attracting increasing criticism. While the moral case for the use of force in protecting civilians from violence is unlikely to diminish, it is unclear whether R2P will ever become a universally accepted principle of international law. This is not to argue that we will not see future unauthorised military interventions by third parties in internal or internationalised internal conflicts. Rather, the point is that these are going to be even more determined by what intervening states consider their strategic interests. To be sure, these played a role in the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, in the case of Darfur only a few years later, in part, explains the lack of any serious commitment on the part of the international community to actively intervene in what is today’s largest-scale humanitarian emergency. A similar case can be made for the relative rush to military intervention in Libya in 2011 and the simultaneous reluctance to become involved in Syria.
The Meaning of Success in Conflict Regulation

The first two conceptual difficulties we identified and discussed above related to the very definition of the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘conflict regulation’, and to the systematisation of the wide range of different policies and institutional procedures of conflict regulation across regional and IOs. The third conceptual difficulty, to which we now turn, concerns the notion of success. We cannot explain why a particular regional or IO has or has not succeeded in particular regulation management efforts unless we establish the parameters of success. Drawing on the work by Pushkina, Peen Rodt in her work on the EU’s performance in military crisis management addresses this difficulty head-on and develops a fourfold notion of success along the lines of internal and external goal attainment and appropriateness. This is a useful framework for a broader definition of the success of regional and international conflict regulation as it highlights several aspects of the difficulties associated with the very notion of success. First among them is the fact that we need to judge the level of success against what a conflict management intervention of any kind – civilian and/or military, short-term and/or long-term – was meant to achieve in terms of the mandate that was given to a particular regional or IO. In other words, did the organisation achieve the goals that it set itself? This is clearly an important benchmark in that it allows us to examine the extent to which existing capabilities can produce desired outcomes. Yet, success in conflict management is not only third-party related, in fact, one might argue it is as much if not more about actual impact on the ground. In other words, the question is not only what outcomes the organisation produced when implementing a particular conflict management operation, but also whether this operation actually had a positive impact on the conflict as a whole.

This distinction between outcomes and impact is not merely an academic exercise: as a number of our case studies demonstrate, in terms of their self-assigned goals, regional and IOs do not often fail in their conflict management efforts. Yet, this is partly due to a more realistic and cautious definition of mission mandates, which no longer seek ‘peace’, but rather more limited and more vaguely defined goals. Moreover, assessing the role of regional and IOs in intra-state conflict regulation also requires us to look further and ask whether these outcomes have actually produced any changes on the ground; in other words, have (passive) support or (active) contribution actually resulted in a conflict being prevented or settled? It is in this dimension that the picture becomes more mixed and success in terms of, in Peen Rodt’s terminology, internal goal attainment needs to be qualified in the light of more limited impact on the ground in terms of the actual conflict.

Where does this conceptual exploration leave us? First, it leaves us with a significant, yet diverse number of cases that, in our definition of the term, qualify as instances of intra-state conflict regulation in which regional and IOs have been, and are being, involved. Second, it leaves us with a range of distinct policies, and institutions that carry them out. Third, it leaves us with a nuanced definition of success that considers both what an organisation has delivered in terms of the goals
that it set itself and how much and what kind of impact its policies have had on the ground. Conversely, explaining varying levels of success, then, requires us to consider both organisational capabilities and the specific context in which they were brought to bear. In other words, if success is ‘measured’ in relation to both mandate completion and actual impact, we cannot focus solely on factors that pertain solely either to the organisation’s existing (or lacking) capabilities or to factors that are specific to the conflict the organisation seeks to regulate. Looking at both internal and external factors allows us to avoid blaming an organisation alone for a particular failure at the one extreme and absolving it from any responsibility on the other.

The challenge for us is now to develop a coherent analytical framework that allows us to bring together the study of regional and IOs and their policies and activities in the field, and to explain why in some cases organisations are more successful than in others. We do so by first considering the current state of the field of the study of regional and international conflict management and then presenting our own approach that has guided the discussion in the contributions that follow this introduction.

EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT REGULATION: CAPABILITIES AND CONTEXT

When it comes to the role of regional and IOs in conflict regulation, two, only partially connected, strands of literature exist. As will become clear from the following case studies, one strand has paid close attention to the development, within given regional and IOs, of institutions and policies, their interrelationships, the divergence and convergence of member states’ preferences, etc. This differs, of course, from organisation to organisation, and is perhaps most developed in the case of the UN and EU. This strand in the literature is naturally very useful for assessments of organisational capabilities.

A second strand of the literature is more case-specific and brings together different scholarship on IOs, international intervention and conflict regulation, and offers comparative and single-case study insights in the performance of regional and regional organisations – individually or collectively – in particular conflict regulation efforts. Such case studies, of varying depth and quality, exist for all the organisations that our contributors consider in the following, their number depending on how important conflict regulation is for a particular organisation and how frequently it happens. Again, literature on UN conflict regulation is the most developed, not least also because the UN has been engaged in this field for more than half a century. The role of the EU in this area has also been widely analysed, while studies on the AU, the SCO and the OIC, on the other hand, remain in their infancy.

If we systematise these two strands in the existing literature, we find that a meaningful analysis of success or failure of conflict regulation by regional and IOs has to consider both organisational capabilities and the specific conflict context in which they are brought to bear. In other words, explaining success of regional and international conflict regulation has to consider two distinct but related sets of
factors internal and external to the organisation involved in a particular conflict regulation effort.

Organisational Capabilities

The internal dimension of our analytical framework comprises three sets of relevant factors; that is, capabilities that any regional or IO must possess to succeed in conflict regulation: capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and coordinate (see Figure 1).21

(1) Capabilities to act: political will, personnel and hardware as well as institutions and instruments;
(2) Capabilities to fund: long-term and short-term;
(3) Capabilities to cooperate and coordinate: among member states and institutions, as well as with third parties (individual states and international/regional governmental and non-governmental organisations).

Capabilities to act. In terms of capabilities to act, political will is a determining factor for conflict management. State leaders have to agree to be involved as mediators and managers in a conflict. This political will is normally contingent on state interests and values, on the type of conflict (limited or widespread) and on the presumed likelihood of the success of any intervention. This presumed likelihood of success, in turn, is a function of an assessment of how well existing capabilities to act, fund, and coordinate and cooperate are a match for the challenges a given intervention is likely to encounter. Capabilities to act crucially depend on the extent to which the availability of personnel and hardware (or lack thereof) enables or hinders an organisation’s ability to pursue conflict regulation, and the degree to which policy instruments are available to back intentions with concrete actions, including, as necessary, resort to military force.

Capabilities to fund. The availability to fund, and sustain, conflict regulation efforts is crucial for their success. Regional and IOs generally face significant problems in this area – either in terms of a lack of funds or a reluctance of member states to commit funds to an organisation or for a particular purpose. Another potential problem is how quickly funds can be made available and how long operations, once initiated, can be financially sustained.
Capabilities to cooperate and coordinate. Coordination and cooperation capabilities have two dimensions: internally, coordination is required between an organisation’s different institutions and between them and the organisation’s member states. This means that an analysis of ‘success factors’ in this respect has to consider relevant actors’ interest structures as well as the opportunities they have to realise these interests on their own or in cooperation with partners within the organisation. Depending on the complexity of organisational structures and the degree to which the organisation itself is a relatively independent actor (i.e. independent of member states) are further factors that determine the effectiveness of internal cooperation and coordination. At the external level, coordination and cooperation with other regional and IOs, individual states and non-governmental organisations is often essential for two reasons. On the one hand, such partnerships can help overcome particular capability deficits of one organisation (for example in relation to available funding, military hardware, etc.). On the other hand, well-coordinated international efforts are more effective in achieving positive impact of conflict regulation policies. In some cases, multilateral efforts involving several regional and/or IOs are also useful in establishing a greater degree of legitimacy of any particular conflict regulation effort among local actors. For example, EU cooperation with NATO (e.g. within the Berlin Plus framework) helps the Union make up for its deficit in military capabilities, while EU–AU cooperation (e.g. the African Peacebuilding Facility) can address the funding gap that the AU frequently encounters. Our analysis in this area will therefore need to focus on the degree to which individual regional and IOs have mechanisms and procedures in place for coordination and cooperation with third parties and how effective these have been on the ground.

The Conflict Context

All three sets of the organisational capabilities examined in the preceding section are, to a relatively large extent, under the control of the organisation concerned. Yet, an organisation’s effectiveness to regulate internal and/or internationalised conflict does not only depend on its own capabilities, but it is also subject to the dynamics of a situation on the ground in the actual conflict, and in particular dependent on the willingness and ability of local conflict parties to submit to, or resist, external conflict regulation efforts, which in turn is shaped by a wide variety of different factors (of which the organisation concerned itself is only one among many). To categorise these different factors and understand their interplay and impact on a given conflict – and thus on a regional or IO’s ability to regulate it successfully – we now turn to adapting a well-known analytical model from international relations theory to our own purposes.

Here, we draw conceptually on a long-established tradition in international relations (IR) scholarship going back more than five decades to 1961 when J. David Singer published an article in *World Politics* entitled ‘The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations’ in which he made a strong case for distinguishing between systemic (global) and subsystem (nation-state) levels for the analysis of various processes in the international system. While Singer offers good general guidance on the levels-of-analysis approach, his counsel is primarily geared towards deciding
which of the two levels he identifies should be chosen, rather than giving scholars and analysts a choice of combining the two levels in their analysis. Two years earlier, Kenneth N. Waltz had offered a consideration of three images (i.e. levels of analysis) in accounting for the occurrence of war, and had suggested that neither human nature nor the aggressive behaviour of states alone accounted for war, but rather that the nature of the international system and the expectation of violence within it led to war. As Jack Levy has pointed out, the levels-of-analysis approach, in the tradition of Singer and Waltz, was subsequently mostly used in IR scholarship to classify ‘independent variables that explain state foreign policy behaviour and international outcomes’. Levy also emphasises that ‘[i]t is logically possible and in fact usually desirable for explanations to combine causal variables from different levels of analysis, because whether war or peace occurs is usually determined by multiple variables operating at more than one level of analysis’. Despite the traditional focus on states and their relations with one another, there is nothing inherently prohibitive in the levels-of-analysis approach to extend its application to non-state actors and structures, and to a range of ‘issues’ that fall somewhere outside the actor and structure dichotomy yet remain important independent variables when accounting for the causes of conflicts within and across, rather than between states and for the success or failure of specific policies adopted to prevent, manage or settle them.

Implicitly or explicitly, earlier models for the analysis of, in particular ethnic, conflict have drawn on a levels-of-analysis approach. Most notably among them, Michael Brown, synthesising the state of the discipline some 15 years ago, suggested a two-stage model accounting for so-called underlying and proximate causes of conflicts. This was in itself a significant advance in the study of internal conflict, as it brought into focus a shortcoming of much of the literature until then which had done ‘a commendable job of surveying the underlying factors or permissive conditions that make some situations particularly prone to violence, but [had remained] weak when it [came] to identifying the catalytic factors – the triggers or proximate causes – of internal conflicts.’ Among the underlying causes he identified structural, political, economic and social, and cultural and perceptual factors, individually or in various combinations, as necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the outbreak of conflict. He then used a variation of the levels-of-analysis approach to account for the impact of proximate causes. Presenting a two-by-two matrix, Brown distinguishes between internal and external elite and mass-level factors that he argues are responsible for triggering conflicts.

This two-level approach is consistent with the traditional neo-realist distinction between the system level and the unit level, but it deprives us of a more nuanced analysis. The terminology used by Brown to describe external-level factors (‘bad neighbours’, ‘bad neighbourhoods’) emphasises the regional level, which is undoubtedly of great importance, but he does so at the expense of the global level. While Brown makes some reference to broader international developments, such as ‘sharp reductions in international financial assistance’ and ‘sharp declines in commodity prices’, more recent literature has identified a range of other factors well beyond a (potential) conflict’s immediate neighbourhood. These include diaspora
international human rights norms and their use in the justification of outside intervention in internal conflicts, the moral hazard that intervention precedents create and links between ethnic conflict and organised crime. Since September 2001, there is also an emerging body of evidence that local conflicts, especially those involving Muslim minorities, have been instrumentalised by al-Qaeda and its local offshoots in their pursuit of global jihad.

Equally, at the internal level, Brown subsumes national-level and local-level factors into one single category, which is also not unproblematic. For example, it is entirely plausible to attribute a significant share of the blame for the violent escalation of the conflicts in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s and in Kosovo in the second half of the 1990s to bad political leaders (i.e. internal elite-triggered factors in Brown’s terminology). Yet, this glosses over significant, and policy-relevant differences, apart from the fact that the United Kingdom was a democracy in the late 1960s, while the former Yugoslavia was at best in a state of arrested transition between communist regime and liberal democratic market economy. The situation in Northern Ireland was very much a local affair between two communities with very different and incompatible conceptions of national belonging exacerbated by economic decline and, at the time, negligible concern by the central government in London. Kosovo, on the other hand, was a conflict primarily between a local secessionist movement and the increasingly repressive institutions of the central government in Belgrade. Thus, while Northern Ireland in the late 1960s had a realistic chance of effective conflict management and settlement by way of a central government acting as an arbiter, this was an opportunity that did not at all exist at all in the case of Kosovo.

Therefore, we propose an analytical model that disaggregates the traditional two levels of analysis into four. At each of these levels, analysis should concern itself with the behaviour and impact of both actors and structures on the onset, duration and termination of ethnic conflicts. The four levels are:

1. The local (or substate) level: existing scholarship suggests that among state actors and structures, local elites/leaders, authorities and representatives of the central government, established institutional arrangements and socio-economic structures play a decisive role, while among non-state actors and structures it is the locally resident communities/ethnic groups/religious groups and their elites/leaders and locally operating NGOs, rebel forces, private-sector interest groups and criminals whose actions and effects are likely to have an impact. For example, for rebel forces with a clear territorial base in part of the state affected by conflict (e.g. in the South Caucasus, Moldova and the Western Balkans), specific local dynamics would need to be considered alongside those at the national level of analysis, regardless of whether the overall aim of the movement is secession, control of local resources or state capture. The same holds true for conflicts that are relatively locally contained or in which the stakes are of a more localised nature (e.g. in the eastern DRC).

2. The state (or national) level: this level of analysis contains essentially the same kinds of actors and structures as they exist at the local level and it is difficult to
imagine situations in which there would be no relevant factors at the state level of analysis. For example the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in Transnistria, had, at least in the early 1990s, a very clear local dimension, but at the same time could not be fully explained without the reference to political, social, economic and cultural dynamics at the state level in Georgia and Moldova – the balance of power and influence of different political parties, the strength of resurgent national sentiment among the titular nations in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the social and economic impact of independence and of the contested nature of emerging states, etc.

3. The regional level: scholarship on regional security and regional conflict would suggest that relevant neighbouring states and their institutions, regional powers and regional IOs, as well as their respective elites/leaders, and established structures of political and economic cooperation are the key variables to consider among state structures and institutions, while cross-border/transnational networks (ethnic, religious, civil society, business, organised crime, rebel groups, etc.) and their elites/leaders are the relevant non-state equivalents. This is very obvious in the cases of Afghanistan and the breakaway territories in Georgia and Moldova, and equally significant in the case of the eastern DRC and across the conflicts in the Western Balkans and Cyprus.

4. The global level of analysis: this level benefits from a large body of existing scholarship, suggesting that powerful states and IOs of global reach and their elites/leaders are the relevant state actors and structures, while international NGOs, diaspora groups, international organised crime networks and transnational corporations (TNCs), as well as their respective elites/leaders are those worthy of consideration among non-state actors and structures. Most prominently, this is the case with Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but it also applies to most of our other cases, including in particular Afghanistan, Georgia and the Western Balkans.

In addition to structures and actors, we consider it worthwhile to examine the impact on conflicts of a range of issues that cannot easily be classified as either actor- or structure-related. These include environmental degradation, resource scarcity, energy security, food security, communicable diseases, etc., all of which by their very nature cannot easily be ‘assigned’ to one particular level of analysis, but rather straddle the boundaries between several levels. For example, energy security is a major factor in South Caucasus, while environmental degradation, food security and resource scarcity matter significantly in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1).

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT REGULATION IN PRACTICE: SEVEN CASE STUDIES

Our introduction began with a conceptual exploration of conflict regulation and existing efforts to explain success and failure of regional and IOs in this area. We found that existing approaches to the study of regional and IOs and conflict regulation are somewhat unconnected when it comes to systematic cross-case and
cross-organisational analysis and do not offer a comprehensive enough framework that could help us understand why a particular organisation might succeed or fail in specific conflict interventions, or in fact become involved in conflict regulation efforts in the first place. To bridge this gap, we developed an analytical framework that combines an assessment of organisational capabilities to act, fund, and coordinate and cooperate with an examination of external factors at local, state, regional and global level that shape a specific conflict and thus co-determine the success or failure of a specific conflict regulation effort. Both sets of factors complement each other and form the cornerstones of an analytical framework that can help us describe in detail the dynamics of specific organisations’ conflict regulation policies and explain their success and/or failure. The following contributions on the UN in Timor-Leste, NATO in Afghanistan, the EU in Macedonia, the OAS in Haiti, the OIC in Mindanao, the SCO in Kyrgyzstan and the AU in Burundi offer both a broad-brush overview of the conflict regulation capabilities and track record of the specific organisation and a more detailed study of one particular case. We briefly summarise the findings of these case studies now before drawing some broader conclusions about general patterns of regional and international conflict regulation and the factors that determine its success and failure.

Starting with the 1990s, in line with Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, there has been greater momentum for the regional organisations’ involvement in preventive

TABLE 1
THE LEVELS-OF-ANALYSIS APPROACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>State structures and actors</th>
<th>Non-state structures and actors</th>
<th>‘Issues’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local elites/leaders, authorities and representatives of the central government, established institutional arrangements and socio-economic structures.</td>
<td>Locally resident communities/ethnic groups/religious groups and their elites/leaders and locally operating NGOs, rebel forces, private-sector interest groups, and criminals.</td>
<td>Environmental degradation, resource scarcity, energy security, food security, communicable diseases, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>National elites/leaders, central government, established institutional arrangements and socio-economic structures.</td>
<td>Communities/ethnic groups/religious groups and their elites/leaders and state-wide operating NGOs, rebel forces, private-sector interest groups, and criminals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Neighbouring states and their institutions, regional powers, and regional IOs, as well as their respective elites/leaders; established structures of political and economic cooperation.</td>
<td>Cross-border/trans-national networks (ethnic, religious, civil society, business, organised crime, rebel groups, etc.) and their elites/leaders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Powerful states and IOs of global reach and their elites/leaders.</td>
<td>International NGOs, diaspora groups, international organised crime networks, and TNCs, as well as their respective elites/leaders.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
diplomacy, conflict management, peace operations and reconstruction. Therefore, it is important to understand the roles played by international and regional organisations in maintaining peace and stability in international affairs. The following case studies serve that specific purpose.

The UN clearly remains the most important IO when it comes to the maintenance of peace and security, as Pushkina and Maier’s study demonstrates with reference to the pivotal role the UN plays in the international system. Following a broader discussion of the nature of the UN and its various conflict regulation capabilities, they attribute the effectiveness of the UN missions in the specific case of Timor-Leste to a favourable combination of the availability of UN capabilities and factors related to the conflict context. They note that the UN provided the necessary financial means for conflict management, and was able to coordinate well with regional partners, such as Australia, Asian countries, the IMF and the World Bank. Pushkina and Maier further note that the internal cooperation between different departments within the UN structure was also conducive to UN’s successful performance in Timor-Leste. While they attract attention to an initial delay in the ‘Timorisation’ of Timor-Leste, they note that the cooperation from the local actors is a key factor in successful peacekeeping operations.

Where the UN is undoubtedly the IO with the widest political legitimacy to undertake conflict regulation, NATO is by far the militarily most capable one. Sperling and Webber’s study of NATO focuses on its role in Afghanistan and identifies a number of key factors that determine the (potential) success of the operation in Afghanistan: the availability of material resources; the political will among the Allies; and the existence of the instruments required to facilitate joint military operations. In contrast, intra- and extra-Alliance coordination is deemed problematic. However, the main difficulty regarding the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan pertains to the difficulty of devising a clear strategy for ISAF. As noted by Sperling and Webber, since ‘the NATO operation is seen as complementary to an ambitious nation-building effort guided by the UN’, with the growing complexity of the nation-building mission, NATO’s role has become more amorphous and multi-layered. In addition, the Alliance continues facing problems in its security coordination with the EU, due to a political crisis between a non-EU NATO member Turkey and a non-NATO EU member Cyprus. Most importantly, as Sperling and Webber note, the progress of the neo-Taliban insurgency has been relentless.

Peen Rodt and Wolff’s contribution analyses the EU’s conflict regulation efforts in Macedonia. Following its initial failure in the Balkans, Peen Rodt and Wolff note, the EU did go through a ‘learning process’, and turned out to be a major factor in the successful prevention of an impending civil war in Macedonia in 2001. Peen Rodt and Wolff’s study mainly attributes this success to the EU’s development of an institutional framework and other necessary means such as personnel, equipment and funding to back up its diplomatic efforts with credible threats of force where necessary. Peen Rodt and Wolff’s study also cautions against over-generalisations and emphasises the fact that the EU uses its policy of conditionality successfully vis-à-vis countries where the promise of closer association with, and potentially accession
to, the EU is credible. Unlike in the case of the OAS in Haiti and the OIC in Mindanao, the EU had a clearly defined set of interests, shared across its member states, which matched, by and large, those of the main local political players. Finally, as noted by Peen Rodt and Wolff, there was a well-functioning multilateral cooperation between the EU and other IOs in Macedonia, which contributed to success on the ground.

Analysing the OAS involvement in Haiti, Smith-Cannoy concludes that while the organisation achieved some success, particularly regarding its Electoral Technical Assistance Program and cooperation with other IOs such as the UN and CARICOM in implementing its mandate; it missed key opportunities to invoke its strongest diplomatic tools in defence of democracy in Haiti. For instance, the OAS did not impose any sanctions to force Aristide to reach a resolution with the opposition. Smith-Cannoy’s contribution aptly illustrates the challenge of an organisation to effectively engaging in peacekeeping activities only with diplomatic tools at its disposal. Finally, Smith-Cannoy’s analysis underlines the lack of political will among the members of the OAS, the challenges poverty in Haiti posed and the lack of sustained engagement by the OAS in the conflict.

The OIC, as noted at the very beginning of Özerdem’s contribution, often does not go beyond serving as a forum for discussion for its members. While the Mindanao conflict has been a long-lasting conflict, the involvement of the OIC has neither been continuous nor consistent. Özerdem’s study, like Smith-Cannoy’s study, attracts attention to the lack of common political will: it underlines the diverging national interests among the OIC members in the Mindanao conflict, particularly between Libya, Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, like the OAS, the OIC also lacks the necessary means and resources for conflict management. To illustrate, although the OIC has been somewhat successful in bringing the parties to the negotiating table, it lacked the monitoring mechanism for maintaining the cease-fire. Finally, the OIC did inadvertently contribute to the intractable nature of the conflict by pursuing an ‘unworkable autonomy arrangement’.

The SCO is perhaps the most under-studied of organisations included here. Aris’ contribution examines the reasons behind the fact that the organisation intervened diplomatically, rather than militarily, in response to the security crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and hence arguably allowed a humanitarian crisis to occur in spite of its mandate for regional security management. Among the factors that account for the SCO’s non-intervention to the Osh riots, beyond its general political aversion to intervention in domestic affairs and lack of experience, Aris’ study cites a variety of factors at a global, regional state and local level. For instance, at the regional level, the controversy revolving around Russian actions in Georgia in 2008 and the fear of increased Russian assertiveness in Central Asia played an important role. Moreover, as noted by Aris, the conflicting political interests of a number of SCO members (such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) might also have contributed to the lack of intervention.

Peen Rodt’s study on the AU focuses on AMIB, and concludes that even though it was the organisation’s first mission, it was a considerable success as it contributed to securing the post-conflict transition in Burundi. Peen Rodt notes that AMIB’s success was partly due to the fact that it established and maintained liaison between
local parties, and in part due to the maintenance of close coordination with external partners such as the EU and the UN. Peen Rodt’s contribution also highlights the importance of the role played by the mission’s lead nation – South Africa, and the significance of internal coordination within the organisation’s members and institutions. Despite the AU’s insufficient financial resources and newly developing institutional infrastructure, the political will of its member states ensured continued support for the mission and helped stabilise the security situation in the country.

CONCLUSION

The brief summaries above of the detailed case studies that follow this introduction indicate that there are a number of broad commonalities across all cases analysed here that are conducive to successful conflict regulation by international and regional organisations. Six of them appear as particularly important.

Availability of Resources and Willingness to Deploy them for Strategic Effect

The success of any conflict regulation mission undertaken by an international or regional organisation is critically dependent on the availability of diplomatic, economic and military tools, and the resources and will to bring them to bear with a strategic purpose in a given conflict situation. This may sound trivial, but it is this trinity of resources, will and strategy that is the most crucial factor in terms of the organisation itself. The lack of will and strategy, rather than a lack of resources per se explains the limited success of, and in fact limited engagement in, conflict regulation on the part of many regional and IOs, including some of those discussed here. In turn, NATO is the best possible illustration of how a combination of resources, will and strategy is an essential ingredient of successful conflict regulation. While success in Afghanistan is far from assured yet, NATO’s success in six of the seven other post-Cold War operations is indisputable: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, two anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, and Libya.37

Commonality of Interest Among the Member States or a Major Lead Nation/s

NATO’s successes also demonstrate the importance of internal consensus and leadership to enable the effective deployment of resources. Yet this point is also obvious when considering the EU’s efforts in the Balkans (and beyond this in its operations in Africa), the AU’s engagement in Burundi and the UN’s role in East Timor. In contrast, the absence of common interests, and/or lack of strong national leadership, helps us understand the reluctance within the SCO to become militarily engaged in Kyrgyzstan and the predominantly supporting role that the OAS had in Haiti.

Long-Term and Continuously Sustained Conflict Regulation Efforts Rather than ad hoc and on and off Crisis Management

Success, especially in the broader sense of a positive, long-term impact on the ground, also depends on how sustained an organisation’s conflict regulation is over time. True, the EU may have failed in its efforts in the Western Balkans in the
first half of the 1990s, but it remained engaged in the region, began to understand much better the complex conflict context there, and developed, and implemented, a long-term strategy that included conflict regulation policies. This has significantly improved the contribution that the Union has made to conflict regulation there since 1995. Similarly, the OIC’s prolonged engagement in Mindanao eventually bore some fruit, and the OAS, too, developed and used more effective policies of conflict regulation in Haiti over the time of its efforts there.

**Effective External Cooperation with Major Partners**

The multilateral character of many successful international and regional conflict regulation efforts, including, but not limited to the cases discussed here, is an indication of the importance of effective external cooperation. It is linked with questions about resources, and especially the complementarity of what different partners can bring to the table. This is quite well illustrated by EU–NATO cooperation in the Western Balkans, EU–AU (and UN) cooperation across Africa and UN–OAS cooperation in the case of Haiti. But there is a broader point about multilateral conflict regulation: it increases the legitimacy of a particular operation and of the practice as a whole, strengthening a culture in which regional and international security is recognised, and practised, as a collective responsibility of states and exercised through the relevant regional and IOs.

**Permissive Conflict Context**

Our study of the role of regional and IOs in conflict regulation is conceptually premised on the assumption that explanations of success and failure have to take account of both organisational capabilities and the degree to which the conflict context in which they are brought to bear is conducive to such efforts. Unsurprisingly, our empirical case studies underline that political, social and economic structures and individual agency within them matter, and that they do so, albeit to varying degrees, at the local, state, regional and international levels. This is fairly self-evident, of course, but there is a related, and perhaps more important point to this: regional and IOs are part of this context and they (and their member states) can actively shape the conditions in which conflict regulation takes place. This highlights the crucial role again not only of resources, but also of political will and a strategy for conflict regulation. In the case of the EU, the organisation’s strategic impact in the Western Balkans today is more significant than it was a decade or two ago, precisely because it has managed to shape the context of the interrelated conflicts in that region, albeit somewhat differently if we compare Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is arguably also the case with the OIC in Mindanao, and both of these cases again also highlight the significant of sustained, long-term engagement.

**Local Interest in Ending Rather than Continuing the Conflict**

The importance of the conflict context, and of shaping it towards more conducive conditions for successful conflict regulation, is perhaps nowhere more important than when it comes to local (elite) interests and agendas. The OAS, more than once,
was constrained by local factions, and one of NATO’s major problems in Afghanistan today is the fact that local leaders – from the President to the Taliban and drug lords – not only have diverse agendas, but are also insufficiently committed to negotiate an end to their differences rather than keep fighting. This also accounts, at least in significant part, for early failures of the EU in the Western Balkans and of the OIC in Mindanao, while also explaining, in part, the success of the UN in East Timor. Local leaders opposed to international and regional conflict regulation remain the most profound stumbling block on the road to success. Yet knowing and understanding the importance of this single factor, in a sense, is also significant in guiding international and regional conflict regulation efforts as it can help, in a strategic sense, to consider necessary and available resources (and any gaps between them), the policies that should be used, the political will required to do so, and the partners to cooperate with.

Identifying a range of factors that are (potentially) conducive to international and regional conflict regulation is neither a blueprint for success nor a carte blanche for intervention. At best, such knowledge can be a tool for understanding better the conditions under which interventions in civil wars can succeed and what capabilities regional and IOs, individually and in concert, require if they seek to prevent, manage and settle intra-state and internationalised conflicts.

NOTES

3. Having made these conceptual distinctions, we have to acknowledge that, in practice, conflict prevention, management and settlement often occur in parallel, and in some cases, the same policy can even be seen as prevention from one perspective, and as management from another.
7. Doyle and Sambanis (note 6).
8. See Pushkina in this issue for further details.
9. See Peen Rodt and Wolff in this issue for further details. A similar case can be made for the AU (see Peen Rodt in this issue).
10. Diehl (note 6).

13. For more details on this and follow-up initiatives, see <www.ecmikosovo.org>.


19. For relevant literature, see bibliographies of individual contributions in this issue.


25. Ibid.


37. The other still ongoing mission, apart from Afghanistan, is NATO’s engagement in providing maritime security from piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. The current Operation Ocean Shield, in addition, offers training to countries in the region to build their own capacity to combat piracy activities, which sets it apart from two earlier, and successful, short-term operations, Operation Allied Provider (October–December 2008) and Operation Allied Protector (March–August 2009), that were focused on maritime security provision only.